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## Over Stretch

#### An exponential increase in targeted killings is coming in the status quo- Obama's recent speech broadens the target spectrum for drones

Lesley Clark and Jonathan S. Landay May 23, 2013"Obama speech suggests possible expansion of drone killings" http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/23/192081/obama-promises-anew-to-transfer.html She arrived in Washington in 2006 as a regional reporter for the Miami Herald, and later the Bradenton Herald as well. She was assigned to cover the White House in July 2011. onathan S. Landay, senior national security and intelligence correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers, has written about foreign affairs and U.S. defense, intelligence and foreign policies for more than 25 years.

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama on Thursday defended his administration’s use of drone strikes to kill terrorists as effective, lawful and “heavily constrained,” but he also appeared to be laying groundwork for an expansion of the controversial targeted killings. In remarks at the National Defense University in Washington, Obama cast the use of such operations as a necessary part of an overall national defense strategy, even as he acknowledged targeted killings risk “creating new enemies” and could “lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.” He said the U.S. is at a crossroads of national security issues with a diffuse array of terrorist threats that require a recasting of a war on terror. “Neither I, nor any president, can promise the total defeat of terror,” Obama said, contending that the threat of large-scale attacks like the Sept. 11 2001, terrorist attacks has faded as al Qaida has been weakened, but that threats like the Boston Marathon bombing and attacks in Benghazi remain. “What we can do – what we must do – is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend.” As part of that, he renewed a first term campaign promise to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, announcing that he’d lift a ban on detainee transfers to Yemen – homeland of half of the 166 captives at the detention facility. The speech served to counter critics who say the drone program has been bathed in secrecy, as Obama offered more details on when the U.S. will deploy drone strikes. But Obama’s speech appeared to expand those who are targeted in drone strikes and other undisclosed “lethal actions” in apparent anticipation of an overhaul of the 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against al Qaida and allied groups that supported the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In every previous speech, interview and congressional testimony, Obama and his top aides have said that drone strikes are restricted to killing confirmed “senior operational leaders of al Qaida and associated forces” plotting imminent violent attacks against the United States. But Obama dropped that wording Thursday, making no reference at all to senior operational leaders. While saying that the United States is at war with al Qaida and its associated forces, he used a variety of descriptions of potential targets, from “those who want to kill us” and “terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat” to “all potential terrorist targets.” The previous wording also was absent from a fact sheet distributed by the White House. Targeted killings outside of “areas of active hostilities,” it said, could be used against “a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks.” The preconditions for targeted killings set out by Obama and the fact sheet appear to correspond to the findings of a McClatchy review published in April of U.S. intelligence reports that showed the CIA killed hundreds of lower-level suspected Afghan, Pakistani and unidentified “other” militants in scores of drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal are during the height of the operations in 2010-11. Nearly 4,000 people are estimated to have died in U.S. drone strikes since 2004, the vast majority if them conducted by the CIA in Pakistan’s tribal area bordering Afghanistan. The fact sheet also said that those who can be killed must pose a “continuing and imminent threat” to “U.S. persons,” setting no geographic limits. Previous administration statements have referred to imminent threats to the United States – the homeland or its interests. “They appear to be broadening the potential target set,” said Christopher Swift, an international legal expert who teaches national security studies at Georgetown University and closely follows the targeted killing issue. At the same time, new presidential guidance on targeted killings that Obama signed Wednesday appeared designed to address charges by some legal scholars and civil and human rights groups that the administration has relied on an overly broad definition of “imminent” that exceeds the international legal standard. In his speech, Obama introduced the phrase “continuing and imminent” in what Swift saw as an effort to better define when the U.S. government can use lethal force. “The standard for the use of force appears to be narrowing because they’ve introduced the standard of imminent and continuing,” Swift said. “Imminent means that the threat poses clear, credible and immediate risk of violence.” Swift said he still has serious problems with the administration’s criteria for targeted killing because it has yet to publicly identify beyond the Afghan Taliban and al Qaida’s regional affiliates the groups that it considers “associated forces” of the terrorist network and the criteria it uses to define them. Several other experts said they also remained troubled because Obama continued to keep secret details of the procedures that the administration uses in deciding who can be targeted in drone strikes and other lethal operations off traditional battlefields. “I don’t think anyone should feel reassured by anything that President Obama said about the use of lethal force,” said Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International. The speech came as the administration has been rattled by a series of controversies, and Obama sought to stem growing criticism of the drone program from members of Congress and civil and human rights groups that charge it’s killed hundreds of civilians and violates U.S. and international law. Obama said the guidelines he signed Wednesday include working with other countries and only using strikes when the U.S. – or other governments – do not have the ability to capture terrorists. He said the U.S. preference is to detain and prosecute, and that drone strikes are not used as “punishment” but to prevent attacks waged by terrorists who pose a “continuing and imminent threat to the American people.”

#### Targeted Killling deconstruct the norms of warfare- 3 warrants

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Kahn.pdfPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights.

This new, high-tech weaponry disrupts many of our traditional expectations about warfare. Gone are long-established ideas about the place or time of combat. Gone too is the traditional idea of the combatant. The drone targets a particular individual, not a class or category of combatants. The victim is targeted for what he has done or is planning to do, not for his status. A person identified in this way has been eliminated; he may have been targeted while he was engaging in the most ordinary activities of private life. The drone is the technological equivalent of the assassin, but without the risk of personal presence.4 That absence means that the drone operates in a zone of asymmetrical violence. The operator kills, but is so removed from battle that he is unlikely even to think of himself as a combatant. He may work a desk job in an office building in an American suburb. Cumulatively, these three categories of disturbance canvas the basic elements of the political imaginary of warfare. Borrowing from Kant, we can call the first category the “aesthetics” of warfare: the spatial and temporal frame of the experience. We can call the second, the subjectivity of the combatant: is the combatant an individual or a corporate subject? The third category is that of the internal morality of combat. Traditionally, combat established a relationship of reciprocal risk – killing was linked to a willingness to be killed. Does the combatant’s privilege of killing depend upon some such reciprocity? At issue in these three categories are the where, the who, and the ethos of political violence. These categories locate us in a common world of meaning. Responding to these categories one way located us in world of warfare; answering them another way located us in a world of law enforcement. Each has been its own world. These worlds, however, are intersecting in contemporary conflicts. One consequence of that intersection is that we don’t know what body of law to apply: international humanitarian law or criminal procedure. Each of these dimensions – the aesthetics, subjectivity, and ethos of combat – must be investigated. That is a large task that can only be sketched here. The problem we confront is not the absence of norms with respect to violence, but rather a surfeit of norms that are not well ordered with respect to each other. There is not one right way to kill and be killed for the sake of political ends. Elsewhere and at other times practices have been different. We can only proceed by examining our own political imaginary as it constructs an image of the ends and means of responding to violence.

#### Allowing these norms to collapse situates the political imaginary of asymmetrical states towards policing and away from sovereignty- war dictates politics instead of the other way around

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Kahn.pdfPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights

There is a banal question that the United States often faces with respect to military deployments around the world. Who, we are asked, made you the policeman to the world? The answer is no one. Communities should be free to make their law for themselves and to struggle with issues of enforcement. The history of nations is not a story of progress, but of struggle. If we believe that national politics is of value, then it is their struggle. We are remarkably obtuse to the lessons of our own history, if we fail to recognize this. What if Britain, prior to the Civil War, had invaded the United States in order to end the practice of slavery? Despite the justice of the end, would the nation have united in resistance? As I argued above, every war can become one of self-defense. Of course, as with any principle, there are exceptions. Nevertheless, our own practices suggest how narrow they are.81 Acknowledging that we are not the world’s policeman, however, does not answer the question of whether we can or should deploy violence abroad. The United States has been more than willing to go to war against its enemies. Indeed, America has been at war or preparing for war for most of the last 100 years. War is not to be explained in terms of justice – the end of law – but in terms of existence. It is the response to the perception of an existential challenge to the popular sovereign. As long as such threats are imagined, war will shape our politics. War and law enforcement are not just formal categories. They refer to structures of the political imaginary before they refer to structures of law. I have tried to delineate the basic categories through which this framing takes place: the aesthetics of war, the subjectivity of the combatant, and the ethos of war. Together, these elements produce a picture of what war is, what it is about, and what norms should govern it. Today, however, we are in an uncertain time. The old pattern of war between sovereign states is breaking apart in the face of new threats. The different elements no longer exist in relationships of mutual support. The balance among the technology of violence, the politics of war, and our normative understanding of the character of the practice no longer holds. Political violence is no longer between states with roughly symmetrical capacities to injure each other; violence no longer occurs on a battlefield between masses of faceless combatants; and those involved no longer seem morally innocent. The drone is both a symbol and a part of the dynamic destruction of what had been a stable imaginative structure. It captures all of these changes: the enemy is not a state, the target is not innocent, the engagement occurs in a normalized time and space, and there is no reciprocity of risk. We can call this situation “war,” but it is no longer clear exactly what that means. If terrorism is with us to stay, we are going to have to have to move beyond criminal or enemy. The confrontation with terror will evolve its own norms, borrowing from the traditional categories of both law enforcement and war. We will need to imagine violence organized around forms of administrative rationality. This is something we have been reluctant to do, given the history of administrative death in the 20th century. Perhaps this time the need will make us more responsive to international institutions than our practice of sacrifice of the corporate body. We simply don’t know. We cannot know, for it is not up to us alone. The terrorist who is presently neither criminal nor enemy will have a good deal to say about this.

#### The paradigm shift destroys the legal distinction between criminal and enemy

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This relationship of representation to identity provides the fundamental structures of the modern political imagination.16 Unless we keep both dimensions of the modern state in mind, we will be at a loss to understand its deeply paradoxical character. The state promised individual well-being under the rule of law, but it also made a total claim on the lives and property within its jurisdiction. The Hobbesian sovereign ended one state of nature only to establish another. The war of individuals ended, while that of states began. It is not at all clear which should be thought of as the more dangerous condition: to be murdered in the state of nature or to die for one’s country. The state was simultaneously the vehicle for peace and war, for life and death. The logic of law pointed to individual well-being as the ground of legitimacy, while sovereign presence depended upon citizens willing to sacrifice themselves. The modern state has been this curious combination of well-being and sacrifice. We hear echoes of this duality today when the American war on terror is simultaneously criticized for its failure to comply with law and for its failure to call on the entire population to share in sacrifice. Political identity in the modern state has been a negotiation of these basic categories. The double character of the state as both an inward order and an outward threat is seen in the multiple pairings of our basic political concepts: law and sovereignty, peace and war, well-being and sacrifice. Carl Schmitt was standing within this tradition when he identified the friend/enemy distinction as the defining political conception.17 That pairing, however, is no more basic than any of the others, including criminal and enemy.

#### That distinction is key to the legitimacy of the state- absent concrete political definitions war and intervention become endless bouts of militarism.

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Kahn.pdfPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights.

Criminal or enemy made literally a world of difference. Entire bodies of law, substantive and procedural, turned on this distinction. More important, our understanding of ourselves – who we are and what we are doing – continues to turn on it.5 Are we defending the state or enforcing the law? Are we killing the enemy or punishing the criminal? Despite the importance of the distinction, there is no formal check list and no single characteristic by which we can determine whether the object of our violence is criminal or enemy. We are long past the time when the declaration of war might have marked the difference.6 We cannot even confidently rely on the presence of the military to tell us that we confront the enemy.7 Especially in a democracy, the question is one of perception: do we see a criminal act or an act of war? Before there is legal distinction, there is an act of the imagination. Getting this distinction right, then, has less to do with law than with popular perception. It is a political decision – some might say the political decision.8 A government that sees criminals where the populace sees the enemy will be judged ineffective or weak. If it sees enemies where the populace sees criminals, it will be judged illegitimate and authoritarian. Governments, of course, are not merely passive in this regard. They try to shape public opinion, but they do not control it. Criminal and enemy amount to different, even opposing, ways of ordering elements within what Clifford Geertz called “webs of significance.”9 Those elements range across the three categories of aesthetics, subjectivity, and ethos. All of these factors are related through habits of thought and perception; all of them are contestable, for we deal here with matters of interpretation. A change in any one factor can lead to a different weighting of the others. Where we once saw an enemy, we may come to see a criminal – and vice versa. Max Weber can help us to begin to frame the inquiry as one that juxtaposes law to sovereignty, which will in turn provide the broad foundation for the distinction of the criminal from the enemy. Weber famously defined the state as a community that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territorial jurisdiction.10 His definition drew on several centuries of imaginative political framing, beginning with Hobbes’s idea of exit from the state of nature. The state of nature is precisely the situation in which there is no successful monopoly on violence. Without that, individuals and groups may be stronger or weaker, they may win or lose over some period of time, but they constantly confront the explicit or implicit threat of violence from others. Only a common belief in legitimacy brings stability.

#### Micro militarism and hot spot management is the kiss of death for unipolar hegemons and accelerates the collapse.

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

Counterintuitively, as their power wanes, empires often plunge into ill-advised military misadventures. This phenomenon is known among historians of empire as “micro-militarism” and seems to involve psychologically compensatory efforts to salve the sting of retreat or defeat by occupying new territories, however briefly and catastrophically. These operations, irrational even from an imperial point of view, often yield hemorrhaging expenditures or humiliating defeats that only accelerate the loss of power. Embattled empires through the ages suffer an arrogance that drives them to plunge ever deeper into military misadventures until defeat becomes debacle. In 413 BCE, a weakened Athens sent 200 ships to be slaughtered in Sicily. In 1921, a dying imperial Spain dispatched 20,000 soldiers to be massacred by Berber guerrillas in Morocco. In 1956, a fading British Empire destroyed its prestige by attacking Suez. And in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. occupied Afghanistan and invaded Iraq. With the hubris that marks empires over the millennia, Washington has increased its troops in Afghanistan to 100,000, expanded the war into Pakistan, and [extended its commitment](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175324/tomgram%3A_engelhardt%2C_general_petraeus%27s_two_campaigns/) to 2014 and beyond, courting disasters large and small in this guerilla-infested, nuclear-armed graveyard of empires.

#### **The decline of American power creates transnational corporations and multilateral forces degrading the earth to urban and rural wastelands with feral failed cities littered with explosions and suicide bombers.**

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

As U.S. power recedes, the past offers a spectrum of possibilities for a future world order. At one end of this spectrum, the rise of a new global superpower, however unlikely, cannot be ruled out. Yet both China and Russia evince self-referential cultures, recondite non-roman scripts, regional defense strategies, and underdeveloped legal systems, denying them key instruments for global dominion. At the moment then, no single superpower seems to be on the horizon likely to succeed the U.S. In a dark, dystopian version of our global future, a coalition of transnational corporations, multilateral forces like NATO, and an international financial elite could conceivably forge a single, possibly unstable, supra-national nexus that would make it no longer meaningful to speak of national empires at all. While denationalized corporations and multinational elites would assumedly rule such a world from secure urban enclaves, the multitudes would be relegated to urban and rural wastelands. In “Planet of Slums,” Mike Davis offers at least a partial vision of such a world from the bottom up. He argues that the billion people already packed into fetid favela-style slums worldwide (rising to two billion by 2030) will make “the ‘feral, failed cities’ of the Third World… the distinctive battlespace of the twenty-first century.” As darkness settles over some future super-favela, “the empire can deploy Orwellian technologies of repression” as “hornet-like helicopter gun-ships stalk enigmatic enemies in the narrow streets of the slum districts… Every morning the slums reply with suicide bombers and eloquent explosions.”

#### **Targeted Killing blurs the lines of war and peace- creates endless warfare and intervention.**

Kitfield ’13 Updated: February 3, 2013 | 9:29 a.m.  January 31, 2013 | 8:20 p.m. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/targeted-killings-obama-s-endless-war-20130131> James Kitfield has written on defense, national security and foreign policy issues from Washington, D.C. for over two decades. He is a three-time winner of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, most recently in 2009 for his first-hand reporting on the Afghan War and other ongoing conflicts and threats. He has twice won the Military Reporters and Editors Association award and the Medill School of Journalism’s top prize for excellence in reporting for his first hand coverage of the war in Afghanistan (2009) and the surge in Iraq (2008). He is a recipient of the 2002 Stewart Alsop Media Excellence Award, sponsored by the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, for his coverage of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and follow-on events. He received the 2001 Peter R. Weitz Prize from the German Marshall Fund for excellence in reporting on European affairs, and the 2000 Edwin Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence given annually by the National Press Club to recognize excellence in reporting on diplomatic and foreign policy issues

A more transparent debate about the program at Brennan’s confirmation hearings is also likely to highlight just how dramatically a decade of war has transformed America. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials routinely criticized Israel for its targeted-assassination program aimed at Palestinian terrorists. Today, deadly strikes by armed robotic drones are so routine that the media give them only passing mention. The U.S. targeted killing program also enjoys support from a majority of the public and from a relatively compliant Congress.¶ As the government has honed the ability to eliminate enemies of the state in a clandestine war without end, however, the once clear lines between all-out warfare and peacetime law enforcement continue to fade. Some Al-Qaida suspects are granted Miranda rights and charged in federal courts, while others are kept in military prisons and prosecuted by military commissions or simply held indefinitely. Still others are eviscerated far from any acknowledged battlefield by an executive branch that claims the authority to act as judge, jury, and executioner. In a nation in a state of perpetual conflict, the danger is that those lines between war and peace will continue to blur until Americans have forgotten the difference.

## Credibility

#### Obama has a unique opportunity to revive American soft power in his second term but the plan is key

Hayes 2012 (Nick Hayes, professor of history who holds the university chair in critical thinking at Saint John's University, December 3, 2012, Minnesota Post, http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2012/12/troubling-questions-about-obama-s-drone-warfare)

My last post argued that, in the wake of his election victory and on the eve of his second term, President Obama stands at what could be his “Truman moment” as a “post war” president. More than a decade of war consumed the two terms of the Bush administration and Obama’s first term. He now faces an historic opportunity to articulate the doctrine and design the framework for an imperfect but lasting peace.

The post stirred up quite of reaction of a number of you. Some readers trashed my interpretation of the past and the present. One reader remembered that long, long ago, I was an aspiring poet and pacifist.

Several readers took me to task for not mentioning Obama’s third war. He has withdrawn from one conventional war in Iraq and promised to complete the withdrawal from the second -- the war in Afghanistan -- by the end of 2014. He is not relenting from a third, highly unconventional war: U.S. drone warfare against suspected terrorist targets in the Middle East and South Asia.

The drone warfare campaign threatens to cost the president much of his political capital abroad. Last week, the PEW Global Attitudes Project released a report with mixed news for Obama. The good news confirmed that world public opinion cheered Obama’s victory over Mitt Romney in the election. The bad news lay in the increasing and widespread disapproval of his foreign policy in general, and especially his use of drone attacks.

World criticism

Criticism of Obama’s drone warfare campaign stands at 80 percent in Egypt, Turkey and Jordan; 75 percent in Spain and Japan; 63 percent in France, and 59 percent in Germany. His personal popularity gives Obama valuable political capital abroad that he should spend wisely to build support for his diplomatic initiatives, especially in the Middle East, and not waste it to vindicate drone warfare that generates more enemies than it kills.

#### Drones now tank US cred—no oversight

Zenko 13, (Micah, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, with expertise in Conflict Prevention; US national security policy, military planning and operations and nuclear weapons policy. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council on Foerign Relations Special Report no. 65, January 2013 <http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736>, pg15)

The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are covert is that both the American and international publics often misunderstand how drones are used. And in affected states, citizens often blame the United States for collateral damage that could have been caused by the host states’ own weapon systems. According to a recent report from Yemen: It’s extremely difficult to figure out who is responsible for any given strike. . . . It could be a manned plane from the Yemeni Air Force or the U.S. military. Or it could be an unmanned drone flown by the U.S. military or the CIA. . . . But no matter who launches a particular strike, Yemenis are likely to blame it on the Americans. What’s more, we found that many more civilians are being killed than officials acknowledge.37 Congressional oversight of drone strikes varies depending on whether the CIA or the U.S. military is the lead executive authority. The CIA, according to the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Dianne Feinstein, meets its “fully and currently informed” legal obligations through “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program.” 38 Individual JSOC strikes are not reported to the relevant armed services committees, but are covered under the broad special access program biannual reporting to Congress. According to senior staff members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of their peers have little understanding of how drone strikes are conducted within the countries for which they are responsible for exercising oversight. Even serving White House officials and members of Congress repeatedly make inaccurate statements about U.S. targeted killings and appear to be unaware of how policies have changed over the past decade.39 At the same time, the judiciary committees have been repeatedly denied access to the June 2010 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that presented the legal basis for the drone strike that killed U.S. citizen and alleged leader of AQAP Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.40 Finally, despite nearly ten years of nonbattlefield targeted killings, no congressional committee has conducted a hearing on any aspect of them.

#### **Generic Soft-Power defense doesn't apply, The US’s new role in global public health means that it has to take different steps to get people on board**

Kickbush ’02 Influence And Opportunity: Reflections On The U.S. Role In Global Public Health¶ [Ilona Kickbusch](http://content.healthaffairs.org/search?author1=Ilona+Kickbusch&sortspec=date&submit=Submit) doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.21.6.131¶ Health Aff November 2002 vol. 21 no. 6 131-141http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/21/6/131.long lona Kickbusch is head of the Division of Global Health at the Yale University School of Medicine, Department of Epidemiology and Public Health. From 1994 to 1998 she was director of communication at the World Health Organization in Geneva

Building a soft-power leadership role.¶ What could be the first steps in building a soft-power leadership role for the United States, taking into account its tendency toward global unilateralism within the administration and political system, on the one hand, and the collective intentionality for recognizing health as a global public good in the nongovernmental community, on the other? It is not helpful to give a long list of “shoulds,” ranging from financial contributions to world agreements, when what is needed is a change in mindset.¶ A first step would be to initiate a truly high-profile public debate on America’s role in global health that gives voice to the many actors, including government, NGOs, the private sector, universities, foundations, the media, and professional organizations. Such a debate would include a series of public hearings on the issues of equity, trade, access to drugs, governance mechanisms, financing global public goods, and the like, thus moving the agenda beyond disease control. It would therefore need not only to be a dialogue of health experts but also to include foreign policy, security, and other policy arenas of relevance.¶ Such a dialogue would go far beyond analyzing the U.S. role in international health agencies and beyond the financial contributions it makes either in multilateral or bilateral actions. It would focus in a much broader fashion on how the United States as a whole—its government, its private sector, its NGOs and foundations, its academic institutions, and its citizens—contributes to and is affected by the global distribution of health and disease. It would take global health from a technical focus into the political arena and identify the political choices that are at stake as well as priority responses.

#### Specifically its key to deal with pandemics and climate change.

Joseph S. Nye, pub. date: 2-16-07, former assistant secretary of defense and president of Harvard's Kennedy school of government, “The long view on China, political Islam and American power,” Financial Times, Lexis Nexis

The third determinant will be American power and how it is used. The US will remain the most powerful country in 2020, but the paradox is that the strongest state since Rome will not be able to protect its citizens acting alone. The US's military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change, terrorism and international crime. These issues require cooperation and the soft power of attracting support. Defeating Islamist terrorism, for example, requires international intelligence and police co-operation, as well as drying up the sources of radical recruits. While hard military power will remain crucial for deterrence, alliances and stability, if we use it in the wrong way, we will undercut the soft power we need to win. Thus far, intelligence reports that US policies have created more new terrorists than they have destroyed. One of the determinants of the future will be whether the US recovers the ability it once had in the cold war to combine hard and soft power into smart power.

#### AND alliances key to global co-op Kreisher 12 (Otto Kreisher, Former Naval Officer/veteran Washington correspondent and defense journalist, “Chuck Hagel, Touted As Next SecDef, Argues For Soft Power, Allies”, December 10 2012, Breaking Defense, http://breakingdefense.com/2012/12/10/chuck-hagel-touted-as-next-secdef-argues-for-soft-power-allie/ )

Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its preeminent military position, Hagel argued that “engagement” is the key to address many international problems. In the national security world, engagement generally encompasses negotiations or multinational efforts. It has never been a popular tactic among most Republicans and some pro-military Democrats. However, Hagel insisted that “engagement is not surrender, it’s not appeasement,” clearly taking on some of his GOP colleagues, who have slung around appeasement — associated with the foolish actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as he tried to avert war with Germany — to describe some of President Barack Obama’s efforts to prevent international tensions from flaring into conflict. Engagement is “an opportunity to better understand” others, Hagel said, and to bring “mutual self respect” among contesting parties. As the U.S. faces a litany of problems and potential crises in the future, he said, “we will need to turn our receivers on and our transmitters off.” The emerging issues, Hagel said, “are beyond the control of any great power” and the U.S. “cannot solve them alone.” Instead, they must be addressed through alliances, through “joint thinking,” he said.

#### Arctic warming is bringing new diseases-threatens the human population

Cooke 6/10 With rising temperatures comes strong evidence that the Arctic is seeing a spike in the rate of various diseases. ¶ 'We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world.'¶ By Kieran Cooke Climate News Network June 10, 2013 <http://wwwp.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2013/06/arctic-disease> Kieran has carried out writing and editing projects for, among others, the World Wildlife Fund ([WWF](http://www.wwf.org.uk/)), the United Nations Environment Programme ([UNEP](http://lightershadeofgreen.com/www.unep.org)) and the Forests and the European Union Research Network ([FERN](http://www.fern.org/))

LONDON – A cow grazing on the lush pasturelands of Cornwall in southwest England and a seal swimming in the ice cold waters of the Arctic might not appear to have much in common.¶ Yet the two are increasingly linked by tuberculosis, with a strain of the disease threatening cattle populations in Britain and elsewhere now showing up among seals in the high Arctic.¶ Claire Heffernan, a veterinarian and a specialist in global health and disease interaction between animals and humans, said that as the climate warms in Arctic regions, more and more diseases from Europe and elsewhere are spreading there, threatening both animal and human populations.¶ "In the past diseases might not have survived in the cold temperatures and the ice of the Arctic but as the region warms a new dynamic is introduced," Heffernan told Climate News Network.¶ "We need to fundamentally alter the way we look at disease in the context of climate change. We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world."

#### And risks biodiversity loss- migration patterns.

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Wide variety of diseases¶ Heffernan, a senior fellow at the Smith School for Enterprise and the Environment in Oxford and director of the livestock development group at the University of Reading, said a wide variety of diseases have recently become evident among Arctic animal populations.¶ Toxoplasma, a parasite common in European cat populations, is now being found in polar bears in Greenland. Erysipelas, a disease of domestic pigs, is being found in musk oxen in the Canadian Arctic: The animals have also been found to have contracted Giardiasis, an intestinal parasite of humans. Meanwhile West Nile virus has been found in wolf pups in the Canadian Arctic Such diseases could have been transmitted in a variety of ways, said Heffernan. The spread of Toxoplasma, for example, might be the result of people flushing cat feces down toilets in the United States and Europe which are then carried by tides to the Arctic. More people are visiting the region. Tourists defecating in the wilds might be the cause of the spread of Erysipelas.¶ "The Arctic is like a Heathrow airport in terms of bird, seal and other migration patterns so that's another way disease is easily spread," said Heffernan. And the disease pathway is not all one way, she added: Pathogens can also be transmitted from the Arctic to elsewhere in the world.

#### **Climate change is releasing new diseases and uncovering old ones in the Arctic- Anthrax, TB, and other ancient diseases**

Cooke 6/10 With rising temperatures comes strong evidence that the Arctic is seeing a spike in the rate of various diseases. ¶ 'We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world.'¶ By Kieran Cooke Climate News Network June 10, 2013

New disease transmission cycle¶ "The point is no one is really joining up the dots between climate change and the spread of disease," Heffernan said. "There's a whole new disease transmission cycle appearing in the Arctic which we just don't understand."¶ Human disease levels in the Arctic are a continuing concern, she noted. Rates of TB among the Inuit of northern Canada are far higher than in the general populationMajor economic change and development now taking place in the Arctic means previously nomadic people are moving to towns in search jobs. Ice melt is also forcing more into settlements. With people living in close proximity to each other, disease tends to spread faster. Infant mortality in the Arctic, much of it due to diseases curable elsewhere in the world, is considerably higher than elsewhere."In 1930s there was a temperature spike in the Arctic which led to an outbreak of malaria," said Heffernan. "In subsequent years chloroquine was used to combat it. But what happens now, with temperatures rising and the prevalence of chloroquine-resistant malaria?"¶ Early in the last century there were periodic outbreaks of anthrax in the Russian Arctic, resulting in the deaths of thousands of deer and cattle. Some Russian scientists and officials have warned that burial sites of those anthrax infected animals are now being exposed.¶ "As the Arctic melts, ancient pathogens can suddenly escape," Heffernan said. "No one knows for certain how many livestock burial sites there are in the Russian Arctic – I've seen estimates ranging from 400 to 13,000."¶ In recent years there have been several anthrax outbreaks affecting both cattle and people reported in the region, particularly among communities of the indigenous Yakut communities, who often live near to such burial sites.¶ With Arctic temperatures rising at more than twice the rate of the rest of the world, Heffernan said there's an urgent need to link disease and climate change and tackle health issues.

#### **Soft power is crucial to the region- needs common agreements and uniform laws.**

Cooke 6/10 With rising temperatures comes strong evidence that the Arctic is seeing a spike in the rate of various diseases. ¶ 'We should recognize disease as a harbinger of a warming world.'¶ By Kieran Cooke Climate News Network June 10, 2013**¶**Preventing action¶ But there are a number of problems preventing concerted action: the Arctic is governed by different states with different laws. There's not even a common agreement among Arctic nation states on the region's boundaries. There's a dearth of trained medical staff and research across the region. When it comes to statistics, the Arctic is something of a black hole with health data subsumed into more general country-wide statistics.¶ "There's very little biosecurity work going on in the Arctic," said Heffernan. "We have the means to control so many of these diseases. There must be urgent, concerted, joined-up action."

#### **Russia is at huge risk for favorable disease outbreak- multiple warrants**

Revich et. al ’12 Boris Revich,1,\* [Nikolai Tokarevich](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Tokarevich%20N%5Bauth%5D),2 and [Alan J. Parkinson](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=Parkinson%20AJ%5Bauth%5D)3¶ 1Institute of Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia¶ 2Paster Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, Saint-Petersburg, Russia¶ 3Arctic Investigations Program, Division of Preparedness and Emerging Infections, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Alaska, Anchorage, USA 2012 Boris Revich et al http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3417549/

A warming Russian Arctic will be associated with a northward expansion of plants and animal associations including their bacterial viral and parasitic flora. These associations will create favourable conditions for the emergence of infectious diseases in regions that were previously free of these pathogens. Several conclusions can be made regarding the potential emergence of zoonotic infectious diseases and their possible influence on the public health of the population of the Russian Arctic:¶ Monitoring of many zoonotic infectious diseases in the Russian Arctic is insufficient; The Russian Arctic is sparsely populated. Many people live in remote settlements with limited access to medical and public health services. Thus many infectious diseases may go undetected and result in an underestimate of the true rate of infection. Efforts should be made to evaluate and improve existing monitoring systems.¶ There is a need to improve laboratory diagnostics for many of these diseases. The finding suggest the need for improved diagnostics of tick-borne infections.¶ There is a need to educate medical providers, public health officials and the public on the role of climate change in the emergence of zoonotic infectious diseases and prevention strategies that can be used. A warming Arctic may also change social behavioural. In a warmer climate people tend to spend more time outdoors in recreational activities, which increases their contacts with vectors of zoonotic infectious diseases emphasizing the need to educate the population on measures that may prevent their exposure.¶ There is a need to raise awareness of at-risk populations to the potential for infection. These may include hunters and workers in the deer breeding and meat handling industries to the potential of infection from contact with meat, skins, and hides.¶ Anthrax cattle burial sites need to be more carefully monitored, for example, by regular visual check-ups of soil condition and bacteriologic analyses of soil samples.

## Plan

#### Text: The United States federal government should statutorily restrict war powers authority of the President of the United States to authorize targeted killings

## Solvency

#### Congressional authority is key to check mission creep and perpetual war

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. March 24, 2011 "Should the President Have Asked Congress for a Declaration of War Against Libya Before Bombing? No" http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/03/should-the-president-have-asked-congress-for-a-declaration-of-war-against-libya-before-bombing-no James Jay Carafano, a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, is The Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies.

No one declares war anymore! Not since World War II has any nation declared war on another — with the possible exception of a 1967 declaration against Israel by five Arab countries. While fighting remains as common as ever, the practice of issuing formal declarations has gone out of style.¶ It's not the first time that's happened. Formal declarations of war fell out of fashion during the 17th century, too. Our Founding Fathers thought that was wrong, and so they stuck a requirement in the Constitution saying Congress must approve a declaration before the nation went to war.¶ But that provision was never intended as an absolute check on executive power. Not all military operations constitute wars. Nor is a war declaration the only legitimate way Congress can signal support for military operations.¶ As "The Heritage Guide to the Constitution" points out, there have been only five declared wars in our nation's history, but numerous other hostilities "have been specifically authorized by Congress through instruments other than formal declarations." The framers of the Constitution, however, did think there was something important about "formal" declarations. Democracies, they felt, were fundamentally different from other states and ought to be as open and transparent as possible about what they were doing.¶ War declarations are part of that transparency regimen. When you declare war, you specify your grievances and how you expect to resolve them. That is actually a good practice, and it is too bad democracies have gotten away from it.¶ Yet, clearly, President Barack Obama has the authority to order the current operations in Libya. The Constitution divides the powers of initiating military actions between the executive and Congress to foster deliberation and consultation to the extent possible under the circumstances. But at the end of the day, the president is the commander in chief. He alone bears the legal and moral responsibility for ordering U.S. armed forces into action.¶ What rankles most about the president's decision on Libya is the lack of open deliberation and discussion. Certainly he had time to consult Congress and the American people, yet he spent much more time consulting the U.N. Security Council.¶ It is discomforting to see an American president seemingly defer to the United Nations rather than lead the country. Moreover, the U.N. resolution he got does not help much. The United Nations is not sovereign, nor do we need its permission to act.¶ Furthermore, the resolution is vague and open-ended. And Obama so far has done little to provide clarity about our objectives and our commitment.¶ These are serious concerns. The lack of congressional consultation and the vagueness of the mission deny Americans what the Constitution intended: a clear statement of purpose about U.S. military action. It is vital to avoid "mission creep" and perpetual fighting.¶ All that said, a declaration of war against Libya would be a bad idea, because going to war in Libya is a bad idea. That is not to say that the United States should do nothing, but Libya does not merit significant, protracted operations by U.S. forces.¶ You fight wars to protect vital national interests. The United States has legitimate interests in the outcome of the Libyan turmoil: seeing Gadhafi brought to justice, and not seeing a new terrorist haven established, a humanitarian crisis, or civil war spreading to nearby nations. But these concerns fall short of being vital national interests and can be addressed through measures short of war.¶

#### Mission creep makes intervention inevitable- endless wars justified by liberal internationalism wreck the economy and dilute diplomacy

Gordon N. Bardos May 24, 2013 "A Foreign Policy of Mission Creep"http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/foreign-policy-mission-creep-8514?page=1 Gordon N. Bardos is the assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University.

In an eye-opening article in these spaces a few weeks ago, James Joyner cited the words of an American general in Afghanistan who, in reciting his troops’ successes in Helmand province, noted that "Roads have been paved and markets secured, allowing commerce to grow in places like Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah . . ." Both the general and his troops undoubtedly performed the mission their country gave them professionally and with dedication. But the exchange still begs utterly valid questions: how, when and why did the growth of commerce in Marja, Nad Ali and Lashkar Gah become worth American lives or taxpayer dollars? And what might this portend for our potential involvement in Syria? Liberal internationalism, so popular in Washington over the past two decades, has transformed the traditional purpose of American foreign policy—historically understood as systematizing relations between sovereign states and attempting to influence the behavior of other countries—into the much more grandiose attempt to remake the political cultures and economic systems of states and societies thousands of miles from our shores. The result of this transformation of U.S. foreign-policy goals has been what Andrew Bacevich once aptly described as “endless war,” in which the U.S. military is used as an instrument for nation- and state-building in open-ended missions around the world. Consider, as outlined below, the record of some of our recent interventions, and the discrepancy in the time required to achieve their respective military and civilian objectives. Needless to say, long-running interventions cost real money. The post-WWII reconstruction of Germany is estimated to have cost some $35 billion in 2011 dollars. Bosnia after 1995 received more money than any country in Europe under the Marshall Plan. As of April 2013, the United States had spent $60 billion on reconstruction in Iraq and $93 billion in Afghanistan (and as of 2005 Kosovo had received twenty-five times the amount provided to Afghanistan in per capita terms). These amounts do not even include these wars’ financial costs, or their costs in human lives. The enormous discrepancy between achieving the military and civilian objectives of our foreign interventions is intimately connected to the recent Washingtonian vogue for Clausewitz’s conflation of war with politics and diplomacy. Thus, in the 1990s Richard Holbrooke became a proponent of “diplomacy backed by force,” and in a memorable exchange between Madeleine Albright and her UK counterpart in the UN Security Council, Albright claimed that “after all, war is merely an extension of politics by other means.” To which her British colleague replied “Yes, Madeleine, that is exactly what Clausewitz said. But he was a German, and the Germans listened to him. Look what happened to them, twice.” The obvious problem here is that with the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and our increasingly grandiose ambitions abroad, we have gone down an intellectual slippery slope: if war is the equivalent of diplomacy and diplomacy is equal to nation-building, it therefore follows that war is the same as nation-building. This equation perhaps explains why the U.S. Army now has considerably more civil-affairs personnel than the U.S. State Department has foreign-service officers. Unfortunately, our grandiose ambition to effect transformative change in far-off countries has not achieved any notable successes. Consider Washington’s pet project in Bosnia, the Muslim-Croat Federation. After Bosnia’s October 2010 elections, it took some six months for the federation to form a government, which Bosnia’s own Central Electoral Commission then ruled had been formed illegally. Bosnia’s international colonial administration, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), however, suspended the ruling. Some twelve months later, political winds in Bosnia shifted, the questionable government fell apart, and a party in the prior ruling coalition went to the federation’s constitutional court to prevent its cadres from being purged from the new government. Unfortunately, the constitutional court could not rule on the issue, since for the past five years Muslim and Croat parties have been unable to agree on replacing the court’s four missing judges. Many of these problems stem from an internationally approved effort to substitute two Bosnian-Croat parties representing some 90 percent of the Bosnian-Croat electorate with a marginal (but malleable) party which scraped up about two percent of the Croat vote. Unfortunately for the international architects of this plan, even this small party has fallen apart, with a faction loyal to the federation president forming a new microparty. Its chances for success at Bosnia’s next elections seem slim, however, since said federation president has recently been arrested. The divided city of Mostar does not have a functioning legal government because it was unable to hold elections in 2012. The OHR imposed a specific electoral regime on the city in 2004, but its solution to the problem has been ruled unconstitutional. In December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia’s current electoral law violates the rights of ethnic minorities to be elected to statewide office, but Muslim and Croat politicians can’t agree on how to amend the constitution. A few months ago, the American ambassador in Sarajevo announced an attempt to reform this chaos, but he is leaving his post in a few weeks. In Iraq, contra Marx’s proposed sequence of events, the farce that has become our Bosnian state-building project is repeated as tragedy. Consider the reality of Iraq in April 2013, a full decade after “mission accomplished” was proclaimed. On April 12, bomb attacks in mosques in Baghdad and Diyala province killed eleven people and wounded 30 more. On April 15, thirty-one people were killed and over two hundred wounded in coordinated bombings in Baghdad, Tuz Khurmatu, Kirkuk, and Nasiriyah. On April 18, twenty-seven people were killed and dozens more injured in a Baghdad café bombing. On April 23, twenty people were killed in clashes between security forces and anti-government Sunni protesters near Kirkuk. On April 24, seven people were killed and more than twenty injured in a car bombing in the Shia district of al-Husseiniyah near Baghdad. On April 25, ten policemen and thirty gunmen were killed in clashes in Mosul. On April 29, eighteen people were killed and dozens injured after five car bombs went off in Shia-majority provinces in southern Iraq. All told, surveying the nation-building achievements of our foreign policy over the past couple of decades is not encouraging. Last summer, seventeen years after the ostensible end of the Bosnian conflict, a local politician told his constituents “The war is not over. We are still fighting the same war.” Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki recently warned that Iraq is in danger of returning to “sectarian war,” and notwithstanding Donald Rumsfeld’s view that “freedom is untidy” and “stuff happens,” an Iraq on the cusp of civil war under increasing Iranian influence is not where the country was supposed to be ten years after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And in Afghanistan, by this time next year there is a good chance the Taliban will again be calling the shots. The lessons of recent decades suggest that American military might can probably (at least eventually) remove Assad from power, but there is precious little historical evidence to show that we can substantively shape the end-state in Syria—the “end-state” here being understood as the six to twelve months after the Washington war lobby and the media lose interest and move on to some more fashionable crisis. President Obama’s inability to get four senators from his own party to vote for gun reform is a stark, telling reminder of the limits of U.S. power, executive and otherwise. Against Clausewitz and his latter-day enthusiasts, the late scholar of international relations Edwin Fedder frequently noted that if you have to resort to military force, your diplomacy has already failed. As the Obama administration debates the pros and cons of intervening in Syria, understanding the differences between diplomacy, waging war and nation-building become more urgent—as does developing a realistic appreciation for what military intervention can and cannot achieve.

#### Restricting the AUMF solves inevitable warfare- creates structural checks to a riskless system

BENJAMIN H. FRIEDMAN JUNE 19, 2012 "Drones, Special Operations, and Whimsical Wars" http://www.cato.org/blog/drones-special-operations-whimsical-wars Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies. His areas of expertise include counter-terrorism, homeland security and defense politics.

Asked the last week on 60 Minutes how many shooting wars the United States is in, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta took a moment to answer. He eventually said we are going after al Qaeda in Pakistan and its “nodes” in Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa. Somehow, he left out the indefinite war we have going in Afghanistan. It’s no wonder that Panetta can’t keep track of the wars he’s supposed to manage. On top of Afghanistan and the drone campaigns, 12,000 U.S. special operations forces are distributed around dozens of countries, increasingly outside declared war zones, where they train foreign militaries, collect intelligence, and occasionally launch lethal raids. As just reported in the Washington Post, some of these forces are now operating a dozen bases across Northern Africa, where their activities include overseeing contractors flying surveillance aircraft. Despite the Obama administration’s claims of great progress in fighting al Qaeda, the global shadow war shows no signs of abating. The official rationale for using force across the world is that al Qaeda is global. But that’s true only thanks to a capacious definition of al Qaeda that imposes a sense of false unity of disparate groups. The always-overrated remnant of the organization that sponsored the 9/11 attacks barely exists anymore, even in Pakistan. Our counterterrorism efforts are directed mostly against others: terrorists that take up al Qaeda’s name and desire to kill westerners but have limited links to the real McCoy, as in Yemen and North Africa, and insurgents friendly to jihadists but mostly consumed by local disputes, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Shabaab in Somalia, and al Qaeda’s Islamist allies in southern Yemen. Like the phony Communist monolith in the Cold War, the myth of a unified, global “al Qaeda” makes actions against vaguely-linked entities—many with no obvious interest in the United States—seem like a coherent campaign against globe trotting menace bent on our destruction. The real reason we are fighting so much these days is that war is too easy. International and domestic restraints on the use of U.S. military power are few. And unrestrained power tends to be exercised. Presidents can use it whimsically, at least until they do something costly that creates a backlash and wakes up public opposition. Drones and special operations forces made this problem worse. Most of the world is what the military calls a permissive environment, especially since the end of the Cold War. Most places lack forces capable of keeping our military out. Many potential allies invite it. The risks traditionally associated with war—invasion, mass death, etc.—are now alien to Americans. Since the draft ended, the consequences of even bad wars for most of us are minor: unsettling media stories and mildly higher taxes deferred by deficits. That’s why, as Nuno Monteiro argues, the U.S. military was already quite busy in the 1990s despite the absence of real enemies. Because war is so cheap, the public has little reason to worry much about it. That leaves elected representatives without any electoral incentive to restrain presidential war powers. No surprise then that the imperial presidency grew as American power did. Technology gains and secrecy exacerbate the problem. Even more than strategic bombing from high altitude, which already prevented U.S. casualties, drones cheapen warfare. Covert raids are riskier, of course, but secrecy limits public appreciation of those risks. The president and his advisors assure us that they use these forces only after solemn debate and nights spent (badly) reading just war theory. But a White House that debates the use of force only with itself short-circuits the democratic process. That is not just a constitutional problem but a practical one. Broad debate among competing powers generally produces better decisions than narrower, unilateral ones. That is why is it is naïve to suggest, as John Fabian Witt did last week in a New York Times op-ed, that the executive branch is developing sensible legal institutions to manage the gray area between war and peace occupied by drone strikes. What’s needed are checks and balances. That means Congress needs to use its war powers. First, Congress should rewrite the 2001 Authorization of Military Force, which has morphed into a legal rationale for doing whatever presidents want in the name of counterterrorism. That bill authorized force against the organizers of the September 11 attacks and those who aided them, which seemed to mean al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan. The new law should state that acts of war, including drone strikes, in other places require a new authorization of force. If Congress is for bombing stuff in Yemen and Somalia, it should debate those missions. Second, Congress should reform the convoluted laws governing the deployment of special operations forces, making their use more onerous and transparent. Those forces should engage in covert action only after a presidential finding, as with the CIA. Third, Congress should require that taxes or offsets fund wars. That would increase debate about their worth. The trouble, as already noted, is that Congress has no interest in doing these things. Congressional leaders are today more interested in policing leaks about the president’s unilateral exercise of war powers than in restraining them. Short of a military disaster involving special operations forces or drones, this seems unlikely to change in the short term. In the longer term, we need a restoration of Congress’ institutional identity. Even without an electoral reason, politicians should want to exercise war powers simply because they can—because people like power. That’s the assumption behind Edward Corwin’s notion that the constitution’s is an “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy. Something has obstructed Congress’ desire to struggle. Those concerned by the president’s promiscuous use of force should try to identify and remove the obstruction.

#### US needs to alter law to be a first mover – international responses to drone proliferation crumble without domestic accountability- restores US cred.

Alston 2011 (Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 2) PY

It might be argued in response by the United States that the standard of accountability required is lower in relation to non-international armed conflicts, which is how the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be categorized by most observers. This lower standard might be said to be evidenced by the fact that states are not obligated to give full access to the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") in such conflicts. But the ICRC's review of customary law makes it abundantly clear that the obligation to ensure accountability applies fully in both international and non-international armed conflicts. This is based on military manuals, including that of the United States, explicit state practice, requirements imposed by the Security Council, and norms endorsed by a range of other international bodies. n88¶ For its part, IHRL, developed by a wide range of international and regional institutions, and reflected in customary law principles, places a particular emphasis on the obligation of states to investigate, prosecute, and punish any alleged violation of the norms banning extrajudicial executions. United States officials, as well as some American commentators, have tended to assume that the duty to investigate alleged violations of the right to life, a duty that has been elaborated upon at length in the jurisprudence of bodies such as the Human Rights Committee n89 and the European Court [\*313] of Human Rights, flows only from specific treaty obligations. n90 By noting that the United States is not a party to the European Convention, and by arguing that the ICCPR does not obligate the United States extraterritorially, n91 they assume that the well-developed jurisprudence emanating from these two bodies has no relevance in determining the United States' obligations in relation to a practice such as extraterritorial targeted killings. Leaving aside the contentious debates over the extraterritorial nature of ICCPR obligations, this approach incorrectly assumes that the duty to investigate killings has no existence in customary international law, independent of treaty obligations. The right to life has long been acknowledged as part of custom, and a duty to investigate has long been assumed to be a central part of that norm, not least by the United States when it consistently calls upon other governments to investigate killings without invoking any specific treaty-based obligations binding upon the governments concerned. n94¶ [\*314] Customary and treaty-based obligations to investigate alleged violations of the right to life can only be met if states accept the need for a degree of transparency which makes it possible to satisfy the obligations to ensure accountability. In explaining what human rights law requires, the European Court of Human Rights has long insisted that "[t]here must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities' adherence to the rule of law and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts." n95 In the same context, the Court has made it clear that there is no single formula by which this is to be achieved, by acknowledging that "[t]he degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case." n96¶ There is thus compelling evidence that both applicable bodies of law require transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, in view of the tendency of those advocating the use of targeted killings to suggest that counter-terrorism requires different rules or that intelligence agencies must operate on a different basis, it is appropriate to consider whether there are circumstances that would warrant the adoption of significantly less demanding standards of accountability. In relation to terrorism, it is often argued that there are unavoidable tradeoffs between security and respect for human rights as well as between security and transparency. In other words, secrecy and limits on rights are part of the price that must be paid for security in a world subject to terrorist threats. While these claims have been thoroughly canvassed in other contexts n97 they call for two particular responses in the present setting. The first is to acknowledge that, in relation [\*315] to targeted killing operations, there are major security and effectiveness concerns that require a strong element of secrecy, rather than disclosure. For example, disclosing the identity of an intelligence source or putting an informant at risk of retaliation will limit the extent to which the information justifying a given targeting decision can be publicly divulged. Similarly, it might be argued that significant disclosure would eliminate the fear or uncertainty factor that is designed to constrain the activities of groups who might conclude from published criteria that they were unlikely to be subject to drone attacks. n98 There will thus be certain limits as to how much transparency can be required.¶ The second response to the argument about necessary tradeoffs is that "security" in this context must be interpreted not only as a goal in itself, but also as a means by which to protect the fundamental values of human rights and democracy. n99 There can thus be no question of simply trading off one value against the other, or of assuming that constraining freedoms increases security. In rejecting what he evocatively describes as the "hydraulic liberty-security metaphor," n100 Stephen Holmes argues that there are in fact many ways in which respect for liberty contributes to enhanced security. While others have also stressed the importance of empirical justifications favoring a degree of transparency on the part of the CIA and other intelligence actors, n101 Holmes invokes what are essentially prudential and efficiency based reasons in support of what he terms "rule-governed counterterrorism." They include the efficiency-enhancing effect of being forced to give reasons for decisions, the greater likelihood that visceral and punitive reactions--which can generally be assumed to be inefficient--will be constrained by following accepted guidelines, the need [\*316] to expose groups of like-minded decision-makers to counter-arguments coming from other perspectives, and the need to deter official reliance on claims of an emergency in order to avoid scrutiny. n102¶ The other argument that suggests the appropriateness of less demanding standards of accountability relates to the special situation of intelligence agencies. In response, it is appropriate to acknowledge the deep tensions between the need for accountability and the inherent bias of such agencies towards unaccountability. It is clearly paradoxical to be seeking transparency and encouraging information sharing from agents whose very existence is premised on secrecy and absolute discretion. The need for intelligence services to be accountable has always been strong simply because of the power that they exercise and the otherwise unlimited potential for abuse of that power. But over the past decade the importance of accountability has grown dramatically for various reasons. Reaction to the events of 9/11 placed intelligence agencies at the forefront of efforts to combat terrorism and put a premium on rapid action, efficiency, and the exercise of only very loosely constrained agency discretion, often at the expense of transparency, respect for human rights, and meaningful congressional consultation. Agency personnel numbers and budgets increased greatly, special operations became far more common, and double-hatting served to make scrutiny more difficult. In addition, joint operations as well as intelligence-sharing with foreign counterpart agencies, often working for authoritarian regimes, became widespread and increased the likelihood of human rights abuses occurring. n103¶ But the challenges to accountability have also multiplied since 9/11. In an age of enhanced global terror operations the structural predisposition to secrecy on the part of intelligence officials has only been strengthened. The heterogeneity and geographical spread of actual and potential terrorist groups, the reality of homegrown terror, and the potential for large-scale acts of terrorism, have all contributed to support for secrecy. This goes beyond the mere need to ensure operational secrecy. Intelligence agencies cannot operate in a traditional hierarchical fashion for fear that a leak at one point in the chain of command will undermine the entire operation. Individual officers are thus given considerable discretion and even relative [\*317] autonomy according to the circumstances. Moreover, the centrality of the notion of "plausible deniability" means that such agencies are often required to act in ways that not only leave no fingerprints, but also leave (almost) no internal paper trail. These factors in turn make the agency less disposed towards, and less accessible to, either internal or external oversight. But the response is not to reinforce these pathological tendencies, but rather to reassert the primacy of IHRL and IHL standards and thus the need for appropriate levels of transparency and accountability, albeit tailored to reflect the legitimate exigencies faced by such actors.¶ Before moving to consider the Obama administration's approach to these issues, it is important to underscore the fact that we are talking about two different levels of accountability. The first is that national procedures must meet certain standards of transparency and accountability in order to meet existing international obligations. The second is that the national procedures must themselves be sufficiently transparent to international bodies as to permit the latter to make their own assessment of the extent to which the state concerned is in compliance with its obligations. In other words, even in situations in which states argue that they put in place highly impartial and reliable accountability mechanisms, the international community cannot be expected to take such assurances on the basis of faith rather than of convincing information. Assurances offered by other states accused of transgressing international standards would not be accepted by the United States in the absence of sufficient information upon the basis of which some form of verification is feasible. Since the 1980s, the phrase "trust but verify" n104 has been something of a mantra in the arms control field, but it is equally applicable in relation to IHL and IHRL. The United States has consistently demanded of other states that they demonstrate to the international community the extent of their compliance with international standards. A great many examples could be cited, not only from the annual State Department reports on the human rights practices of other states, but also from a range of statements by the President and the Secretary of State in relation to countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria in the context of the Arab Spring of 2011.

#### Squo drone strategy unsustainable--- host-state and domestic backlash--- plan solves and establishes global norms for drone use

Zenko 2013 (Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at CFR, previously worked at Harvard Kennedy School and State Department, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR Special Report No 56)

Over the past decade, the use of unmanned aerial systems—commonly referred to as drones—by the U.S. government has expanded exponentially in scope, location, and frequency.1 From September 2001 to April 2012, the U.S. military increased its drone inventory from fifty to seventy-five hundred—of which approximately 5 percent can be armed.2 Yet despite the unprecedented escalation of its fleet and mis- sions, the U.S. government has not provided a clear explanation of how drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings are coordinated with broader foreign policy objectives, the scope of legitimate targets, and the legal framework. Drones are critical counterterrorism tools that advance U.S. interests around the globe, but this lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation of armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework.

Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are likely to grow over time. The first comes from operational restrictions on drones due to domestic and international pressure. In the United States, the public and policymakers are increasingly uneasy with limited transparency for targeted killings.3 If the present trajectory continues, drones may share the fate of Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques and warrantless wiretapping—the unpopularity and illegality of which eventually caused the policy’s demise. Internationally, objections from host states and other counterterrorism partners could also severely circumscribe drones’ effectiveness. Host states have grown frustrated with U.S. drone policy, while opposition by nonhost partners could impose additional restrictions on the use of drones. Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay concerns internationally by ensuring that targeted killings are defensible under international legal regimes that the United States itself helped estab- lish, and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and counter misinformation.

3 The second major risk is that of proliferation. Over the next decade, the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries develop and hone this capability. The advantages and effectiveness of drones in attacking hard-to-reach and time-sensitive targets are com- pelling many countries to indigenously develop or explore purchasing unmanned aerial systems. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy pro- vides a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications. Reforming its practices could allow the United States to regain moral authority in dealings with other states and credibly engage with the international community to shape norms for responsible drone use.

The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable. Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated, unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with impunity. Consequently, the United States should more fully explain and reform aspects of its policies on drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings by ending the controversial practice of “signature strikes”; limiting tar- geted killings to leaders of transnational terrorist organizations and individuals with direct involvement in past or ongoing plots against the United States and its allies; and clarifying rules of the road for drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Given that the United States is currently the only country—other than the United Kingdom in the tra- ditional battlefield of Afghanistan and perhaps Israel—to use drones to attack the sovereign territory of another country, it has a unique opportunity and responsibility to engage relevant international actors and shape development of a normative framework for acceptable use of drones.

# 2AC

## OS

## Cred

## Solvency

#### AUMF restrictions solve drones- doesn't hurt Obama's war powers

Brooks 2013 (Rosa Brooks, law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation, March 14, 2013, “Mission Creep in the War on Terror,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/14/mission\_creep\_in\_the\_war\_on\_terror?page=full)

Just who is behind this notion is unclear, but the idea of a revised AUMF has been gaining considerable bipartisan traction outside the administration. In a recent Hoover Institution publication, for instance, Bobby Chesney, who served in the Obama Justice Department, teams up with Brookings's Ben Wittes and Bush administration veterans Jack Goldsmith and Matt Waxman to argue for a revised AUMF -- one that can provide "a new legal foundation for next-generation terrorist threats."

I'm as fond of the rule of law as the next gal, so in a general sense, I applaud the desire to ensure that future executive branch counterterrorist activities are consistent with the laws passed by Congress. But "laws" and "the rule of law" are two different animals, and an expanded new AUMF is a bad idea.Sure, legislative authorization for the use of force against "next generation" terrorist threats would give an additional veneer of legality to U.S. drone policy, and make congressional testimony less uncomfortable for John Brennan and Eric Holder. But an expanded AUMF would also likely lead to thoughtless further expansion of targeted killings. This would be strategically foolish, and would further undermine the rule of law.

An expanded AUMF is also unnecessary. Even if Congress simply repealed the 2001 AUMF (as the New York Times editorial board urges) instead of revising it, the president already has all the legal authority he needs to keep the nation safe.authority (or international law authority) to use force against any terrorist organization that poses an imminent and grave threat to the United States. U.S. drone policy is on shaky legal ground because the administration has lost sight of the difference between threats that are imminent and grave and threats better characterized as speculative and minor. We've lost all sense of perspective, and strategically, we've lost the ball.Rather than fudging the law and the facts, or changing the law, the administration would do better to revert to Option 1: reform U.S. drone policy to comply with longstanding legal norms governing the use of force.

## CP

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the CP

#### Perm do the CP then the plan

#### Condo Bad

#### 1. 2AC skew- it's the speech that generates the most offense so every second counts, their paradigm introduces multiple neg positions that can be dropped at any point

#### 2. They encourage unfair neg practices that evolve into structural barriers which diminish the aff's chance of success

#### 3. Fairness is prerequisite to education- prevents disenfranchisement and boosts participation

#### 4. Depth> Breadth- Focused discussions yield better educational value, multiple conditional advocacies focus the debate on infinitely regressive implementation questions- that's why we have fiat

#### 5. Dispo solves their offense

#### A) Neg Flexibility- Straight turn option puts the ball back in the Aff's court

#### B) Education- There is more clash without multiple advocacies- that's k2 test an arguments legitmacy and check rhetorical assertions

#### War is spatially defined by invading the borders that separate sovereign states- neglecting this construct causes genocide and endless war

Paul Kahn 2011 "Imagining Warfare" http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/1/199.abstractPaul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale Law School and the Director of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights

The border has become a geographical representation of national existence. It signifies more than a traditional homeland for an ethnically or religiously defined group. Indeed, claims for an ethnic homeland have an archaic sense about them. They represent a failure of a regime of popular sovereignty to realize an autochthonous political presence. This is often characterized as a failure of law: an ethnic minority might be denied rights, including property rights. More importantly, however, there is a failure in the existential dimension: to link territory and ethnicity is to exclude others within the border from the popular sovereign. They can, in that case, be imagined as the enemy, which can lead to policies of ethnic cleansing. As the enemy, they are to be driven across the border. Because the failure is existential, the effort to “cure” the problem by the extension of legal rights may not succeed – at least not without significant third party intervention. The modern configuration of an autochthonous, territorial politics of sovereignty begins in the revolutions of the 18th century. Revolutionaries proclaim the rights of man, but as the French Declaration tellingly expressed it, rights of man “and of the citizen.”35 The universal is, thereby, linked to a particular space. Whatever their dreams of universality, revolutions have not generally achieved solidarity across borders. Rather, they produce a symbolic investment in borders. Revolutionary regimes set about mapping the state.36 This modern connection of borders to popular sovereignty reached its fullest expression in the post-war decolonization movement. “Uti possidetis” was the governing territorial principle, even though colonial borders failed to map preexisting ethnic communities. Nationhood followed upon statehood, because the popular sovereign brings itself into being by its revolutionary act of self-expression. This actor, the popular sovereign, has become everyone living within the border.37 That moment of self-creation changes the meaning of the colonial border from historically contingent to politically necessary. The border now marks a kind of sacred space, for here the popular sovereign revealed, and thus created, itself.38 This is the territorial regime enshrined in the UN Charter. Every state has the right to defend itself against armed attack.39 An attack is imagined as a cross-border penetration. The Charter text contains no suggestion that a cross-border penetration is any less of an attack if it is done for humanitarian reasons – unless pursuant to Security Council action. Self-defense is not about justice, but about protecting the political space of sovereignty. If it is the case that we are entering an era in which sovereignty is an outdated notion, or in which it is conditioned on the justice of a regime, then we should expect to see a reduction in the symbolic power of the border. Europe is just such an example: the citizens of the EU cannot be enemies of each other for they have the right freely to cross borders.40 A global regime in which all borders could be freely crossed would be one in which the concept of the enemy no longer figured. Territory would give way to property and the enemy to the criminal. The border, accordingly, gives us a geographical representation of the enemy: the enemy transgresses the border. Claims that borders are not just or that they are the product of a history of power do not make the enemy less of an enemy. Under the Charter regime, borders are imagined as forever, because the protection of the border is imagined as the elimination of war. It follows that no state can shift its borders – annex territory – through the use of force, regardless of how just the change might be. A world of perfectly respected borders would be one that [“saves] succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” For the same reason, the Charter regime has dealt much more awkwardly with claims of secession and civil war, viewing them within the paradigm of third party – i.e., cross-border – effects and participation

#### This unique instance of disassociation establishes competing forms of combatant subjectivity that break down our ability to predict, and historically assess lethal acts of violence

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Corporate identity has informed both sides of modern war. The enemy is not killed as an individual. He remains the enemy even if he has done nothing wrong – indeed, even if he disagrees with the policies of his government. Friends can become enemies because the category has nothing to do with personal subjectivity. The enemy is always faceless because we don’t care about his personal history any more than we care about his hopes for the future. Once there is a return to the normal, one-time enemies can come to see each other as uniquely bound to each other; they have shared an extraordinary experience. We see this today in the gatherings of veterans from both sides of the Second World War. Nothing need be forgiven, for despite the killing and destruction no one did anything wrong. In some deep sense, no one did anything at all. The corporate character of the popular sovereign stands opposed to the individualism of the rule of law upon which so much of our liberalism is based. Neither is it adequately captured by speaking of the “status” of the combatant. Status is a way of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants, not a way of capturing the nature of political identity at stake in the life and death of the state. The popular sovereign is the direct successor to the mystical corpus of the sacral monarch. The metaphysics here is Christological – the mystical body of the Church – but the phenomenon has broader roots.57 The erotic character of the political community is expressed in this notion of corporate identity.58 In and through the popular sovereign, we are one with those who came before and those who will come after. Corporate identity lies behind the intergenerational sense of responsibility that informs much of our political ethos: the nation is responsible for its past wrongs just as it responsible to those not yet living. Contemporary theorists are likely to dismiss the idea of the corporate subject as merely psychological – a matter of emotion rather than reason. That dismissal, however, no less indulges a metaphysical assumption: one of individual subjectivity. When we look at the history of our politics, as well as of our faith, it is not clear why we should prefer that metaphysical assumption over the competing idea of corporate subjectivity. In truth, both ideas occupy the political imaginary, giving us a politics that embraces both the rule of law and popular sovereignty. We cannot stand outside of this experience and declare one claim to be true and the other false. We make judgments about who we are and how to regard others from within our political practices and beliefs. Distinguishing criminals from enemies is one such judgment: the criminal is always an individual; the enemy is not. Keeping these competing forms of subjectivity in a stable relationship to each other is an endless task of managing the political imagination. In war, whenever the individual breaks through, we find ourselves deeply uncertain about what to do or how to judge acts of killing and being killed. Every war spawns stories of the outbreak of personal comradery between enemies, as they momentarily recognize that they have much in common and “no reason” to kill each other.59 They have become individual subjects in a world that only appears to the corporate subject. If this attitude persists, the war is over, for the exception has passed. At the other end, corporate personhood is policed by the idea of war crimes. These acts are not attributable to the sovereign body, but only to the individual.

#### Reciprocity should be a prior question to the ramifications of conflict - abandoning those ethos allow the US re-imagine war as an existential condition

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Of all of things that organized communities do, going to war is surely the most difficult to understand. Familiarity does not make the cognitive task any easier. War depends upon a willingness of individuals to imagine themselves performing the two most difficult acts: killing and being killed. The close and intimate relationship between these two acts suggests that we should think of warfare as reciprocal acts of self-sacrifice.63 Each side believes it must kill, just as each is willing to die. Figuratively, it is the willingness to die that creates the license to kill; formally, the reciprocity of threat grounds the doctrine of the combatant’s privilege; politically, every war is justified as one of self-defense. The internal ethos of modern warfare arises out of the imagined reciprocal imposition of risk.64 Where reciprocity clearly ends, humanitarian concerns arise. Thus, combatants can surrender. They can also find themselves “hors de combat,” when they are incapable of posing a further threat – e.g., from injury or shipwreck. Of course, the normative idea of reciprocity is only a rough approximation of the actual situation, for it is not the actual threat of the particular combatant that matters. A cook behind the lines may be targeted in the same way as an infantryman on the battlefield. The reciprocity of threat cannot detach itself entirely from the idea of corporate subjectivity. The ethos of reciprocity operates independently of the ends of war. The justice or injustice of those ends does not tell us who can kill or be killed. War has been imagined, instead, as an existential condition. A state will defend itself; it does not first ask whether it is worth defending. Indeed, once war begins – regardless of the reasons for its beginning – it may rapidly become a war of self-defense. Because every war can tend toward the extreme issue of life and death for the state, every war can tend toward a limitless use of force. The modern project of IHL can be understood as an effort to moderate the existential impulse to transgress every limit.65 The ethos of reciprocity is given formal expression in IHL’s creation of the combatant’s privilege. Only those who expose themselves to a reciprocal risk of injury are legally protected for their own acts of violence. The basic norm here builds on the practice of the duel. Consent is constructed through the reciprocal exposure to each other’s act of intentional violence. This ethical norm of reciprocity, however, runs deeper than IHL’s formal expression of its limits. Thus, a person who targets the military may fall outside of IHL’s protection by failing to wear a uniform, but he is in a different ethical position from the person who targets civilians in order to avoid risk. We are often not sure whether to call the former a terrorist.66 At war’s end, he may be entitled to the respect of an adversary.

## NB

#### **Full Collapse by 2025- all models are indicating American power is waning no soft landing.**

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

A soft landing for America 40 years from now? Don’t bet on it. The demise of the United States as the global superpower could come far more quickly than anyone imagines. If Washington is dreaming of 2040 or 2050 as the end of the American Century, a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends suggests that in 2025, just 15 years from now, it could all be over except for the shouting. Despite the aura of omnipotence most empires project, a look at their history should remind us that they are fragile organisms. So delicate is their ecology of power that, when things start to go truly bad, empires regularly unravel with unholy speed: just a year for Portugal, two years for the Soviet Union, eight years for France, 11 years for the Ottomans, 17 years for Great Britain, and, in all likelihood, 22 years for the United States, counting from the crucial year 2003. Future historians are likely to identify the Bush administration’s rash invasion of Iraq in that year as the start of America’s downfall. However, instead of the bloodshed that marked the end of so many past empires, with cities burning and civilians slaughtered, this twenty-first century imperial collapse could come relatively quietly through the invisible tendrils of economic collapse or cyberwarfare. But have no doubt: when Washington’s global dominion finally ends, there will be painful daily reminders of what such a loss of power means for Americans in every walk of life. As a half-dozen European nations have discovered, imperial decline tends to have a remarkably demoralizing impact on a society, regularly bringing at least a generation of economic privation. As the economy cools, political temperatures rise, often sparking serious domestic unrest. Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to U.S. global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by 2020 and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than 2030. The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by 2025, its eighth decade, and could be history by 2030

#### **We are past the point of no return- wars, debt, low energy supplies and lack of domestic education ensure full collapse of American primacy.**

McCoy ’10MONDAY, DEC 6, 2010 02:01 PM CST [How America will collapse (by 2025)](http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/) Four scenarios that could spell the end of the United States as we know it -- in the very near future BY ALFRED MCCOY <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/>Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, "From the Cold War to the War on Terror." Later this year, "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State," a forthcoming book of his, will explore the influence of overseas counterinsurgency operations on the spread of internal security measures here at home

If America’s decline is in fact on a 22-year trajectory from 2003 to 2025, then we have already frittered away most of the first decade of that decline with wars that distracted us from long-term problems and, like water tossed onto desert sands, [wasted](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702846.html) trillions of desperately needed dollars. If only 15 years remain, the odds of frittering them all away still remain high. Congress and the president are now in gridlock; the American system is flooded with corporate money meant to jam up the works; and there is little suggestion that any issues of significance, including our wars, our bloated national security state, our starved education system, and our antiquated energy supplies, will be addressed with sufficient seriousness to assure the sort of soft landing that might maximize our country’s role and prosperity in a changing world. Europe’s empires are gone and America’s imperium is going. It seems increasingly doubtful that the United States will have anything like Britain’s success in shaping a succeeding world order that protects its interests, preserves its prosperity, and bears the imprint of its best values.

Alfred W. McCoy and Brett Reilly April 25, 2011 "An Empire of Autocrats, Aristocrats and Uniformed Thugs Begins to Totter" http://www.thenation.com/article/160146/empire-autocrats-aristocrats-and-uniformed-thugs-begins-totter?page=0,1 Brett Reilly is a graduate student in History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he is studying US foreign policy in Asia. Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Post–Cold War World¶ After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, ending the cold war, Moscow quickly lost its satellite states from Estonia to Azerbaijan, as once-loyal Soviet surrogates were ousted or leapt off the sinking ship of empire. For Washington, the “victor” and soon to be the “sole superpower” on planet Earth, the same process would begin to happen, but at a far slower pace.¶ Over the next two decades, globalization fostered a multipolar system of rising powers in Beijing, New Delhi, Moscow, Ankara and Brasilia, even as a denationalized system of corporate power reduced the dependency of developing economies on any single state, however imperial. With its capacity for controlling elites receding, Washington has faced ideological competition from Islamic fundamentalism, European regulatory regimes, Chinese state capitalism and a rising tide of economic nationalism in Latin America.¶ As US power and influence declined, Washington’s attempts to control its subordinate elites began to fail, often spectacularly—including its efforts to topple bête noire Hugo Chávez of Venezuela in a badly bungled 2002 coup, to detach ally Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia from Russia’s orbit in 2008 and to oust nemesis Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2009 Iranian elections. Where a CIA coup or covert cash once sufficed to defeat an antagonist, the Bush administration needed a massive invasion to topple just one troublesome dictator, Saddam Hussein. Even then, it found its plans for subsequent regime change in Syria and Iran blocked when these states instead aided a devastating insurgency against US forces inside Iraq.¶ Similarly, despite the infusions of billions of dollars in foreign aid, Washington has found it nearly impossible to control the Afghan president it installed in power, Hamid Karzai, who memorably summed up his fractious relationship with Washington to American envoys this way: “If you're looking for a stooge and calling a stooge a partner, no. If you're looking for a partner, yes.”¶ Then, late in 2010, WikiLeaks began distributing those thousands of US diplomatic cables that offer uncensored insights into Washington’s weakening control over the system of surrogate power that it had built up for fifty years. In reading these documents, Israeli journalist Aluf Benn of Haaretz could see “the fall of the American empire, the decline of a superpower that ruled the world by the dint of its military and economic supremacy.” No longer, he added, are “American ambassadors…received in world capitals as ‘high commissioners'.... [Instead, they are] tired bureaucrats.... [who] spend their days listening wearily to their hosts' talking points, never reminding them who is the superpower and who the client state.”¶ Indeed, what the WikiLeaks documents show is a State Department struggling to manage an unruly global system of increasingly insubordinate elites by any means possible—via intrigue to collect needed information and intelligence, friendly acts meant to coax compliance, threats to coerce cooperation and billions of dollars in misspent aid to court influence. In early 2009, for instance, the State Department instructed its embassies worldwide to play imperial police by collecting comprehensive data on local leaders, including “email addresses, telephone and fax numbers, fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.” Showing its need, like some colonial governor, for incriminating information on the locals, the State Department also pressed its Bahrain embassy for sordid details, damaging in an Islamic society, about the kingdom’s crown princes, asking: “Is there any derogatory information on either prince? Does either prince drink alcohol? Does either one use drugs?"¶ With the hauteur of latter-day imperial envoys, US diplomats seemed to empower themselves for dominance by dismissing “the Turks neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle East and Balkans,” or by knowing the weaknesses of their subordinate elites, notably Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s “voluptuous blonde” nurse, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s morbid fear of military coups, or Afghan Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud’s $52 million in stolen funds.¶ As its influence declines, however, Washington is finding many of its chosen local allies either increasingly insubordinate or irrelevant, particularly in the strategic Middle East. In mid-2009, for instance, the US ambassador to Tunisia reported that “President Ben Ali…and his regime have lost touch with the Tunisian people,” relying “on the police for control,” while “corruption in the inner circle is growing” and “the risks to the regime's long-term stability are increasing.” Even so, the US envoy could only recommend that Washington “dial back the public criticism” and instead rely only on “frequent high-level private candor”—a policy that failed to produce any reforms before demonstrations toppled the regime just eighteen months later.¶ Similarly, in late 2008 the American Embassy in Cairo feared that “Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts...are being suffocated.” However, as the embassy admitted, “we would not like to contemplate complications for US regional interests should the US-Egyptian bond be seriously weakened.” When Mubarak visited Washington a few months later, the Embassy urged the White House “to restore the sense of warmth that has traditionally characterized the US-Egyptian partnership.” And so in June 2009, just eighteen months before the Egyptian president’s downfall, President Obama hailed this useful dictator as “a stalwart ally...a force for stability and good in the region."¶ As the crisis in Cairo’s Tahrir Square unfolded, respected opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei complained bitterly that Washington was pushing “the whole Arab world into radicalization with this inept policy of supporting repression.” After forty years of US dominion, the Middle East was, he said, “a collection of failed states that add nothing to humanity or science” because “people were taught not to think or to act, and were consistently given an inferior education.”¶ Absent a global war capable of simply sweeping away an empire, the decline of a great power is often a fitful, painful, drawn-out affair. In addition to the two American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down to something not so far short of defeat, the nation’s capital is now writhing in fiscal crisis, the coin of the realm is losing its creditworthiness, and longtime allies are forging economic and even military ties to rival China. To all of this, we must now add the possible loss of loyal surrogates across the Middle East.¶ For more than fifty years, Washington has been served well by a system of global power based on subordinate elites. That system once facilitated the extension of American influence worldwide with a surprising efficiency and (relatively speaking) an economy of force. Now, however, those loyal allies increasingly look like an empire of failed or insubordinate states. Make no mistake: the degradation of, or ending of, half a century of such ties is likely to leave Washington on the rocks.

Alfred W. McCoy and Brett Reilly April 25, 2011 "An Empire of Autocrats, Aristocrats and Uniformed Thugs Begins to Totter" http://www.thenation.com/article/160146/empire-autocrats-aristocrats-and-uniformed-thugs-begins-totter?page=0,1 Brett Reilly is a graduate student in History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he is studying US foreign policy in Asia. Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

In one of history’s lucky accidents, the juxtaposition of two extraordinary events has stripped the architecture of American global power bare for all to see. Last November, WikiLeaks splashed snippets from US embassy cables, loaded with scurrilous comments about national leaders from Argentina to Zimbabwe, on the front pages of newspapers worldwide. Then just a few weeks later, the Middle East erupted in pro-democracy protests against the region’s autocratic leaders, many of whom were close US allies whose foibles had been so conveniently detailed in those same diplomatic cables. Suddenly, it was possible to see the foundations of a US world order that rested significantly on national leaders who serve Washington as loyal “subordinate elites” and who are, in reality, a motley collection of autocrats, aristocrats and uniformed thugs. Visible as well was the larger logic of otherwise inexplicable US foreign policy choices over the past half-century.¶ Why would the CIA risk controversy in 1965, at the height of the cold war, by overthrowing an accepted leader like Sukarno in Indonesia or encouraging the assassination of the Catholic autocrat Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon in 1963? The answer—and thanks to WikiLeaks and the “Arab Spring,” this is now so much clearer—is that both were Washington’s chosen subordinates until each became insubordinate and expendable.¶ Why, half a century later, would Washington betray its stated democratic principles by backing Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak against millions of demonstrators and then, when he faltered, use its leverage to replace him, at least initially with his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, a man best known for running Cairo’s torture chambers (and lending them out to Washington)? The answer again: because both were reliable subordinates who had long served Washington’s interests well in this key Arab state.¶ Across the Greater Middle East from Tunisia and Egypt to Bahrain and Yemen, democratic protests are threatening to sweep away subordinate elites crucial to the wielding of American power. Of course, all modern empires have relied on dependable surrogates to translate their global power into local control—and for most of them, the moment when those elites began to stir, talk back and set their own agendas was also the moment when it became clear that imperial collapse was in the cards.¶ If the "velvet revolutions” that swept Eastern Europe in 1989 tolled the death knell for the Soviet empire, then the "jasmine revolutions" now spreading across the Middle East may well mark the beginning of the end for American global power.

Alfred W. McCoy and Brett Reilly April 25, 2011 "An Empire of Autocrats, Aristocrats and Uniformed Thugs Begins to Totter" http://www.thenation.com/article/160146/empire-autocrats-aristocrats-and-uniformed-thugs-begins-totter?page=0,1 Brett Reilly is a graduate student in History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he is studying US foreign policy in Asia. Alfred W. McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

America is by no means the first hegemon to build its global power on the gossamer threads of personal ties to local leaders. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain may have ruled the waves (as America would later rule the skies), but when it came to the ground, like empires past it needed local allies who could serve as intermediaries in controlling complex, volatile societies. Otherwise, how in 1900 could a small island nation of just 40 million with an army of only 99,000 men rule a global empire of some 400 million, nearly a quarter of all humanity?¶ From 1850 to 1950, Britain controlled its formal colonies through an extraordinary array of local allies—from Fiji island chiefs and Malay sultans to Indian maharajas and African emirs. Simultaneously, through subordinate elites Britain reigned over an even larger “informal empire” that encompassed emperors (from Beijing to Istanbul), kings (from Bangkok to Cairo) and presidents (from Buenos Aires to Caracas). At its peak in 1880, Britain's informal empire in Latin America, the Middle East and China was larger, in population, than its formal colonial holdings in India and Africa. Its entire global empire, encompassing nearly half of humanity, rested on these slender ties of cooperation to loyal local elites.¶ Following four centuries of relentless imperial expansion, however, Europe’s five major overseas empires were suddenly erased from the globe in a quarter-century of decolonization. Between 1947 and 1974, the Belgian, British, Dutch, French and Portuguese empires faded fast from Asia and Africa, giving way to a hundred new nations, more than half of today’s sovereign states. In searching for an explanation for this sudden, sweeping change, most scholars agree with British imperial historian Ronald Robinson, who famously argued that “when colonial rulers had run out of indigenous collaborators,” their power began to fade.During the cold war that coincided with this era of rapid decolonization, the world’s two superpowers turned to the same methods regularly using their espionage agencies to manipulate the leaders of newly independent states. The Soviet Union’s KGB and its surrogates like the Stasi in East Germany and the Securitate in Romania enforced political conformity among the fourteen Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe and challenged the United States for loyal allies across the Third World. Simultaneously, the CIA monitored the loyalties of presidents, autocrats and dictators on four continents, employing coups, bribery and covert penetration to control and, when necessary, remove nettlesome leaders. In an era of nationalist feeling, however, the loyalty of local elites proved a complex matter indeed. Many of them were driven by conflicting loyalties and often deep feelings of nationalism, which meant that they had to be monitored closely. So critical were these subordinate elites, and so troublesome were their insubordinate iterations, that the CIA repeatedly launched risky covert operations to bring them to heel, sparking some of the great crises of the cold war.¶ Given the rise of its system of global control in a post–World War II age of independence, Washington had little choice but to work not simply with surrogates or puppets but with allies who—admittedly from weaker positions—still sought to maximize what they saw as their nations’ interests (as well as their own). Even at the height of American global power in the 1950s, when its dominance was relatively unquestioned, Washington was forced into hard bargaining with the likes of the Philippines’ Raymond Magsaysay, South Korean autocrat Syngman Rhee and South Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem.¶ In South Korea during the 1960s, for instance, General Park Chung Hee, then president, bartered troop deployments to Vietnam for billions of US development dollars, which helped spark the country's economic "miracle." In the process, Washington paid up, but got what it most wanted: 50,000 of those tough Korean troops as guns-for-hire helpers in its unpopular war in Vietnam.

## Iran DA

#### Sanctions and hardline stance make prolif inevitable

Logan 2012 [Justin Logan is director of foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute April 4, 2012 The American Conservative “Time-Bomb Diplomacy” http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/time-bomb-diplomacy/]

In the long term, the problem is that it will be very hard for Washington to convince Tehran that it can trust American assurances. If Iran complies with whatever demands are made of it, how can it be sure that the United States will not attack anyway at some point in the future? It is very hard for a unipolar power like the United States to credibly commit to abstaining from doing something in the future because the cost of reneging is relatively low. Leslie Gelb and Vice President Joseph Biden, in an interview for Newsweek, had this exchange:¶ NEWSWEEK: [A]s you know from Iran’s point of view, they say, all right, Pakistan crossed [the nuclear] threshold. North Korea crossed that threshold. They’re safer now than they would have been otherwise because we can’t attack them anymore.¶ BIDEN: I understand their rationale. But the fact of the matter is that doesn’t mean it makes sense for the region and the world to yield to their rationale. And we’re going to do everything in our power…¶ In other words, Biden understands that the Iranians need a nuclear capability to deter us, but he’s not interested in doing anything to change their rationale. President Obama made a similar point inadvertently in an interview with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg by using Libya as a case in point for how he hopes diplomacy can produce nonproliferation.¶ One does not have to be extraordinarily empathetic to see how the prospect of a Libya-style deal might play with Iran’s Supreme Leader. Put bluntly, given the past decade of U.S. foreign policy and the structure of the international system, Iran would be irrational not to want a nuke. Our policy of sanctions and pressure is doing little to change that.

#### Iran prolif is inevitable- sanctions will fail

Waltz 2012 [Kenneth N. Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University Jul/Aug 2012 Foreign Affairs Vol. 91, Issue 4 “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” Ebsco]

The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and un Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent.

#### Iran prolif produces Middle East stability

Waltz 2012 [Kenneth N. Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University Jul/Aug 2012 Foreign Affairs Vol. 91, Issue 4 “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” Ebsco]

In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed¶ states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.¶ For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose.¶ Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.

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